Aviation Security

Aviation Security Efforts after Pan Am 103 

In August 1989, President George H.W. Bush, by executive order, created the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. A report was issued in May 1990 that showed: 

  • the U.S. civil aviation security system was seriously flawed and had failed to provide the proper level of protection for the traveling public,

  • the Federal Aviation Administration was a reactive agency — preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion of adequate contingency planning in anticipation of future threats,

  • Pan Am’s apparent security lapses and FAA’s failure to enforce its own regulations followed a pattern that existed for months prior to Pan Am Flight 103, during the day of the tragedy, and — notably — for nine months thereafter, and

  • The destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 may well have been preventable if the following measures had been enacted:

    • Stricter baggage reconciliation procedures could have stopped any unaccompanied checked bags from boarding the flight at Frankfurt, 

    • Requiring that all baggage containers be fully secured would have prevented any tampering that may have occurred with baggage left in a partially filled, unguarded baggage container that was later loaded on the flight at Heathrow, and 

    • Stricter application of passenger screening procedures would have increased the likelihood of intercepting any unknowing “dupe” or saboteur from checking a bomb into the plane at either airport.

The 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act implemented the recommendations (pg. 120-125 of report) of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. 

U.S. Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Summary

On the 103rd day following the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, VPAF103, Inc. members met with many members of the House and Senate demanding action. The VPAF103, Inc. leaders then met with President H. W. Bush in the White House. As a result of our actions, the President commissioned the Department of Transportation to develop a plan for aviation security.  After two meetings, Congress took over, and ASAC was officially established in 1989.

The role of ASAC is to provide advice to the TSA administrator on aviation security matters. ASAC’s individual members represent 19 key stakeholder groups affected by aviation security requirements, including victims of terrorist acts against aviation. VPAF103, Inc. has been represented on the committee since its inception. 

The Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation Act of 2014, enacted on December 18, 2014, makes the committee permanent. It states the following: 

Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation Act of 2014 - Directs the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration [TSA]) to establish in the TSA an aviation security advisory committee.

Requires the Assistant Secretary to consult with the Advisory Committee on aviation security matters. 

Requires the Advisory Committee to develop, upon the Assistant Secretary's request, recommendations to improve aviation security. 

Requires the Assistant Secretary to appoint to the Advisory Committee members representing up to 34 member organizations, including air carriers, all-cargo air transportation, indirect air carriers, labor organizations representing air carrier employees as well as those representing transportation security officers, aircraft manufacturers, airport operators, airport construction and maintenance contractors as well as labor organizations representing them, general aviation, privacy organizations, the travel industry, airport-based businesses, businesses that conduct security operations at airports, aeronautical repair stations, passenger advocacy groups, the aviation security technology industry (including screening technology and biometrics), victims of terrorist acts against aviation, and law enforcement and security experts.

Establishes within the Advisory Committee: (1) an air cargo security subcommittee; (2) a general aviation subcommittee; (3) an airport perimeter security and access control subcommittee; and (4) a security technology subcommittee. Requires all subcommittees to consider risk-based security approaches in the performance of their functions with respect to transportation security.

Aviation Security - 9/11

Despite the efforts to enhance airline security, the cracks in U.S. aviation security system were all too apparent on September 11, 2001. Improved security measures, some contained in federal legislation, some made as part of Presidential Commission investigating the Pan Am 103, had never been implemented. 

The Federal Aviation Administration dragged its feet on these measures.  The airlines fought hard to delay implementing security measures. They complained that security changes were too expensive and that consumers would not tolerate the delays caused by increased security measures.

There was a failure of imagination on the part of the FAA, which was not capable of imagining ways in which bad actors might try to target commercial aviation (e.g. at the time of 9/11, the FAA permitted knives with 4” blades to be taken on board commercial aircraft).

Even after September 11 and a massive Federal bail-out, the airlines, through their lobbying arm: the Air Transport Association (ATA), tried 11th hour tactics to change deadlines for meeting security requirements specified in the aviation security bill passed because of September 11. The ATA lobbied hard to change the deadline which required all airlines to come up with an interim plan to screen checked baggage.  When this did not work, the ATA tried to insert an extended deadline into the Defense Appropriations Bill.    

Post 9/11, Department of Homeland Security was created as was the Transportation Security Association (TSA). ASAC became an advisory committee to the TSA.

To learn more about post 9/11 airline security:

Trump Administration Termination of ASAC

On January 20, 2025, members of ASAC received a memo saying The Department of Homeland Security was eliminating the membership of all advisory committees as part of a “commitment to eliminating the misuse of resources and ensuring that DHS activities prioritize our national security.”

Read the VPAF103, Inc. statement on the termination of DHS Aviation Security Advisory Committee. 

On February 4, 2024, Senator Chuck Schumer (NYS) called on the DHS Secretary to immediately reinstate Pan Am Flight 103 inspired Aviation Security Committee. 

On February 12, 2025, Congress sent a letter to the President Trump regarding concerns about airline safety following the devastating midair collision between an American Airlines regional jet and a US Army Black Hawk helicopter in the Washington, DC on January 29, 2025.